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One important contribution in economic theory in the last years has been
the study of strategic tax interactions among jurisdictions. Those theoretical
processes are assumed to be due to yardstick competition or tax competition.
On the one hand, yardstick competition explains that voters may evaluate the
decision of their policy makers by comparing similar policies in neighboring re-
gions. Under those circumstances, governments may be forced to emulate each
other leading to uniformity in taxes. On the other hand, tax competition argues
that in open economies "independent governments engage in wasteful competi-
tion for scarce capital through reductions in tax rates and public expenditure
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level", Wilson (1999)[54]. Nevertheless, both models arrive to the same conclu-
sions: taxes depend on own countries characteristics and taxes in neighboring
countries.
In this article, we examine whether those tax interactions are present in the
EU-15 using diﬀerent eﬀective tax rates on corporations. Moreover, we analyze
which space might be relevant in the determination of tax reaction functions
across countries.
Our results indicate that strategic interactions among European countries
are rather scarce. Two notable exceptions are the eﬀective taxes based on the
tax codes and the statutory corporate taxes. Their spatial interaction mainly
support the idea of tax competition, given that, as Redoano (2003)[42] points
out, "Corporate taxes mainly aﬀect firms’ location and investments but only a
minority of voters, therefore any strategic behavior by governments should be
related to tax competition to attract tax base rather than yardstick competition
to attract voters". Furthermore, we observe that the EU-15 acts as a block
suﬀering common external shocks.
There exists a widespread belief among politicians and many academic re-
searchers that an increasing openness or globalization of the economies is leading
countries to a race to the bottom in corporate taxation (European Commission,
2001[19]).
Several papers have confronted that question with available data. Slem-
rod (2004)[49] found that "measures of openness are negatively associated with
statutory corporate rates, although not with revenues collected as a fraction
of GDP". Other studies support those findings, though some others arrive to
diﬀerent results. Among the supporters of a negative association, we also find:
Rodrik (1997)[45] who shows that taxes on capital for OECD countries during
the period 1965-91 respond negatively to increases in openness, while taxes on
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labor respond positively; Swank and Steinmo (2002)[53] who show that capital
mobility and trade are associated with cuts in statutory corporate tax rates;
and Winner (2005)[55] who finds that capital mobility exerts a negative impact
on capital tax burden, and a positive one on labor tax burden. On the oppo-
site side, we have studies such as Quinn (1997)[41] finding significant evidence
that capital account liberalization is positively associated with corporate tax-
ation. Nevertheless, some other works observe that globalization is unrelated
with corporate taxation (Garrett, 1998)[28].
The main drawback of those kind of studies in an economic area such as
the European Union, where restrictions to the movement of capital have been
eliminated, is the interpretation of the parameter "openness". This term cannot
carry any meaning in a by definition open internal market economy. For that
reason, instead of analyzing a consequence (or a derived result) of a tax compe-
tition model, we will examine the real grounds over which that model is based,
i.e. whether governments in setting their corporate tax rate consider taxes in
neighboring countries.
As a direct way to validate the hypothesis, models of yardstick and tax com-
petition usually propose an equilibrium level, which can be empirically tested
through tax reaction functions (see for example Brueckner (2003)[13]). That
same line will be followed in the empirical estimation of this article. However,
one point must be clear at this stage. The presence of those interactions does not
tell us the direction taxes take. They only indicate that governments consider
in their decision process the policies of their neighbors or competing countries.
They do not provide any information of a race to the bottom or stabilization
around another stationary level.
There exists a small recent literature attempting to estimate tax reaction
functions of national governments competing against other national govern-
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D., L. and R. (2002) R. (2003) A. and G. (2002) B., G. and K. (2002)
EATR Corporate Stat. tax SGDP SGDP
Inv. dist. weight Yes (+) Yes (+) Yes (+) ---
GDP weight Yes (+) Yes (+) --- ---
GDP per capita weight --- No --- ---
OECD equal weight --- --- --- Yes (+)
Figure 1: Are there strategic interactions among countries?
ments. The results of that literature are summarized in Figure 1, highlighting
the presence of strategic interactions among countries. Among those papers, we
have the work of Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002)[22], finding evidence
that OECD countries with relatively high eﬀective average tax rates (EATR)
tend to respond more strongly to tax rates in other countries. On the other
hand, they only find weak evidence that countries compete over eﬀective mar-
ginal tax rates (EMTR). In other words, their study finds positive reaction
functions using EATRs and considering as neighbors those countries close in ge-
ographical distance and GDP. Similarly, Redoano (2003)[42] finds evidence that
tax competition mainly occurs with geographically close countries, showing the
same positive eﬀects as the previous study, using statutory tax rates, but no
evidence of strategic interactions when considering GDP per capita. Altshuler
and Goodspeed (2002)[1], obtain a positive Nash reaction function for European
countries using corporate tax revenue over GDP (SGDP) and countries close in
geographical distance, but no reaction with respect to labor taxes. They also
suggest that over time, European countries have competed more intensely with
the US in corporate taxes, but less intensely among themselves. Finally, Besley,
Griﬃth and Klemm (2001)[9], observe that taxes on mobile factors in OECD
countries react more than taxes on less mobile factors considering corporate tax
revenue over GDP (SGDP) and giving equal weight to all countries.
Several other works examine strategic interactions within a country. With-
out being exhaustive, a summary of papers for the US is the following: Ladd
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(1992)[34] shows that tax mimicking appears among neighboring counties; Kele-
jian and Robinson (1993)[33] indicate that public expenditure positively influ-
ence neighbors considering a large number of counties; Anderson and Wass-
mer (1995)[2] find an emulation eﬀect of property tax abatement oﬀers among
municipalities in metropolitan Detroit; Brueckner (1998)[12] provides evidence
on strategic interaction among local governments in California; Brueckner and
Saavedra (2001)[14] investigate local property tax competition in the Boston
metropolitan area; Case, Rosen and Hines (1993)[17] observe that states’ expen-
ditures depend on the spending of neighboring states; Figlio, Kolpin and Reid
(1999)[27] explore the degree to which states simultaneously set welfare bene-
fits; Besley and Case (1995)[8] provide evidence of yardstick competition among
states; Rork (2003)[46] disaggregates Besley and Case tax measure into its in-
dividual components, and observes how those taxes mimic neighboring states;
Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001)[25] find vertical interdependence of taxes.
For other countries we also have a large empirical literature: Brett and Pinkse
(2000)[11] find some evidence that municipalities in the province of British
Columbia (Canada) react to increases in business property tax rates of their
neighbors, although they argue against the presence of competition for capital;
Hayashi and Boadway (2001)[29] observe significant vertical and horizontal tax
interactions among Canadian provinces; Revelli (2001)[43] tests for mimicky
in local tax setting in English districts; Revelli (2003)[44] explores horizontal
and vertical fiscal interactions at the level of English local governments; Bor-
dignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003)[10] test for fiscal interaction arising from
yardstick competition among Italian local governments; Heyndels and Vuche-
len (1998)[30] present evidence of tax mimicking among Belgian municipalities;
Buettner (2001)[16] identifies strategic business tax interactions among German
local jurisdictions; Solé-Ollé (2003)[50] confirms the presence of tax mimick-
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ing behavior among Spanish municipalities; Feld and Reulier (2005)[26] provide
evidence on strategic tax setting by Swiss cantonal governments; Dubois, Lep-
rince and Paty (2005)[23], Paty (2006)[40], Jayet, Paty and Pentel (2002)[31],
Leprince, Paty and Reulier (2005)[36], Leprince, Madiès and Paty (2005)[35]
and Charlot and Paty (2005)[18] observe strategic tax interactions among local
French jurisdictions.
The rest of the paper is structured as following. In section 1, we explore the
equation used to detect strategic interactions. Section 2 presents the data and
Section 3 the weighting schemes. In Section 4, we estimate a spatial panel and
test its structure. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our conclusions.
1 Do countries play Nash equilibrium strategies
in tax rates?
The basic result of the tax competition literature states that the local capital
tax rate should react to tax changes in other competing countries. The classical
approach to empirically test this assumption has been to estimate tax reaction
functions (see Brueckner, 2003). The reaction function tries to capture how the
magnitude of a tax, a decision variable of a government, depends on taxes set
on other countries. In other words, the estimating equation may be written:
ti = α+ β
X
j 6=i
'ijtj +Xiθ + i (1)
where t is the tax rate, α, β and θ vector are parameters to be estimated and
 is the error term. Additionally, we assign weights 'ij indicating the possible
influence of neighboring taxes in the determination of the local tax.
Some main problems arise in the estimation of equation (1), notably the
endogeneity of tj ’s and possible spatial error dependence (see Anselin, 1988[3]).
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We discuss those issues in Appendix A.
The first term on the RHS of equation (1) is referred to as the spatially
lagged dependent variable, with associated autoregressive parameter β. If the
slope of the estimated reaction function is non-zero we can speak of a strategic
interaction among governments. In other words, a test on the absence of any
spatial dependence is a test on the joint null hypothesis H0 : β = 0 and λ = 0,
where λ measures the spatial dependence in the error term. Typically, the tests
are carried out looking for one kind of dependence and assuming the other to
be absent. In one word, the null hypothesis in a spatial lag test is H0 : β = 0,
conditional upon λ = 0, and similarly, a test for spatial error dependence is
H0 : λ = 0, conditional upon β = 0.
In X we add a number of explanatory variables that aﬀect the tax level and
the payoﬀ function of the country. However, we could hardly include all benefits
for the countries like reciprocity or reputation when we examine this repeated
game played by sovereign states, or more simply, the fairness norm used by the
decision maker. As we mention in Appendix A, the omitted variables included
in the error term are likely to be spatially dependent. For example, reciprocity
value is by itself a multidirectional flow, probably being stronger among those
entities with closer links. Ignoring this problem may cause a positive estimate
of β, while in reality there is not strategic interaction, but only spatial error
dependence.
Another important problem in this kind of studies is that the spatial depen-
dence may transcend the boundaries of the data set. This edge eﬀect is multi-
directional in the sense that values outside the sample are not only influencing
those available observations, but also are influenced by those in the sample. It is
clear for our problem that EU corporate taxes are influencing taxes outside the
union, but at the same time, they are being influenced by those taxes. Never-
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theless, we are expecting (assuming) that the eﬀects of such actions are limited
and less hurting because of the barriers imposed by the union.
2 Data
The sample is composed of 4 diﬀerent eﬀective average capital tax rates1 plus
the statutory corporate tax. The eﬀective taxes try to summarize, in a way,
the country’s corporate tax system. Each of them has its pros and cons, and
they are surely perfectible variables. Nevertheless, they represent examples of
the four diﬀerent average eﬀective tax rates on capital presented in Ruiz and
Gérard (2007)[48].
The first selected series (hereafter EATR) are the ones constructed by De-
vereux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002)[21] available on line at www.ifs.org.uk, in
Table A9, for 13 countries of the EU. A second series (hereafter BACH) were
constructed following the same methodology as in Nicodème (2001)[39], as the
ratio of taxes paid on gross operating profit. The sector chosen is the manu-
facturing enterprises for 11 countries of the EU. For the third series we work
with data produced by Martinez-Mongay (2000) [38] (hereafter MM) for 15 EU
countries. He calculated an eﬀective capital income tax considering taxes on
personal income from capital, taxes on corporate income and property taxes.
Finally, we constructed series of corporate tax revenue expressed as percentage
of GDP (hereafter SGDP) for 15 EU countries. A detailed description of how
the series are constructed is given in Appendix B.
For our panel estimation of Section 4 and Section 6, we take the period 1982-
2001 with EATR, 1982-2001 with the Statutory tax, 1991-2001 with BACH,
1979-2001 with MM and 1989-2001 with SGDP. As a set of control variables
in Section 4, we include domestic socio-economic characteristics, which try to
1Those variables are used in Ruiz (2006)[47].
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capture factors influencing the corporate tax rate. On the other hand, interna-
tional pressures are implicitly taken into account in the design of strategic tax
interactions among countries.
The first domestic explanatory variable is based in what Slemrod calls the
folk theorem among tax policymakers: "all taxes have weaknesses, and the
marginal social cost of the weaknesses increase with the tax system’s reliance
on any given tax. Therefore, revenues should be collected from a variety of
taxes rather than a small number". Therefore, as an implication, if government
spending increases, revenue needs to increase and corporate taxation should
follow that tendency.
The second variable tries to capture the vision of many policymakers and vot-
ers, which observe the corporate taxation as an instrument for tax progressivity
and redistribution. This tax, in fact, may allow a sort of resource redistribution
among the population. Particularly, we use as a proxy for redistribution the
fraction of population over 65 years old given that the higher their percentage,
the higher the financing needs for pensions and health services.
The third variable searches to observe the size eﬀect of a country. Several
theoretical models such as Bucovetsky (1991)[15] analyze diﬀerences in the size
of the competing countries, arriving to the conclusion that the larger the country
the higher the tax rate it chooses.
The last variable tries to capture the eﬀect of EU accession in the capital
tax. Given that not all countries of our dataset were in the European Union at
the beginning of the series, we expect that becoming a member increases the
pressures of tax competition, inducing a change in the tax rate.
In a preliminary version of this paper we considered other explanatory vari-
ables such as tax on labor, capital stock and net returns to capital. Those
variables were not finally retained because of a possible endogeneity problem
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Variable Description Source
GEXP/GDP Government final consumption expenditure divided by GDP OECD
Po65/Po Population +65 divided by total population AMECO
Size GDP divided by the sum of GDPs of the EU  AMECO
EU Dummy variable, 1 = member of the EU
Figure 2: Domestic socio-economic control variables.
(other variables as FDI suﬀer a similar drawback). We also explored political
variables, for example the percentage of left party legislative seats and left party
cabinet portfolios. Likewise they were dropped from the estimation because they
appeared not significant.2
3 Weighting schemes
Uncertainty with respect to the proper specification of the spatial weights matrix
is a fundamental problem in the study of strategic interactions, particularly,
because we do not exactly know where international pressures come from. A
potential problem of drawing inappropriate conclusions arises, as the specified
weight matrix may not be the true weight matrix, or in other words, we have
a problem of a priori finding the correct links of tax settings among countries
(if there is one). Stetzer (1982)[52] illustrates how a misspecified weight matrix
may result in inconsistent estimates and misleading inference. One potential
solution may be the use of Getis-Ord statistic to endogenously detect spatial
clustering. However, the use of that statistic on the small cross-sectional sample
of our study does not shed additional light on the source of the spatial interaction
among countries.
Although the weights imposed in (1) may seem arbitrary, we explore a va-
riety of weighting schemes to establish which patterns of spatial interaction are
2A Moran’s I statistic was also estimated for two years showing a few significant results.
Particularly, we found some spatial autocorrelation for taxes based on the tax codes at the
beginning of the sample. Results can be requested to the authors.
10
relevant for the capital reaction function across countries (clearly a choice of
diﬀerent weights is likely to result in a diﬀerent estimation for β, although, in
all cases, the estimated coeﬃcient must be smaller than one because of stability
issues).3
A panel version of model (1) is estimated using a total of seven weighting
matrices, each of them row standardized such that the
nP
j=1
'ij = 1. The weights
can be separated in three categories: geographical weights (weights W-1, W-
2 and W-3), economic weights (weights W-4 and W-5) and clustering weights
(weights W-6 and W-7). The first weighting matrix is a distance matrix, which
considers as neighboring countries those states whose capitals are within a given
minimum distance (δ) required to ensure that each location has at least one
neighbor. An equal weight is given to those countries within the distance-band.
A second weighting scheme assigns an inverse distance weight to those countries
within the distance-band explained before (i.e. 'ij =
1/dij
nP
j=1
1/dij
if dij ≤ δ, 'ij = 0
if dij > δ). The third weighting matrix considers as neighbors all countries of
the sample and the weights are simply the inverse distance. The fourth weights
are based on economic characteristics giving to each country a weight depending
on the diﬀerence of GDP (i.e. 'ij =
1
|GDPi−GDPj |
nP
j=1
1
|GDPi−GDPj |
). This scheme provides
stronger links to those countries closer in GDP. The fifth approach is similar to
the weights 4 but considering GDP per capita. Weight 6 considers as neighbors
those countries with similar tax systems as clustered in the Company taxation
report (European Commission 2002 [20], table 1.5),4 giving equal weight to each
neighbor. Finally, weight 7 clusters countries in two groups: high statutory tax
3With IV estimations the spatially autoregressive parameter is unrestricted and it may
result in values larger than one. That may indicate to a general misspecification of the model.
4The neighbors are: Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Finland; Greece, France, Ireland
and Italy; Denmark, Germany, Spain and Sweden; Luxembourg, Portugal and United King-
dom.
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rates5 and low statutory tax rates6 in the year 2001.
4 Panel estimation
4.1 Pooled cross-section estimation without considering
international pressures
Let us begin by examining a classical panel data model. We include in all cases
country fixed eﬀects to account for any unobserved individual characteristics
that are not included in the regression and may explain diﬀerences in mean
levels across countries. Moreover, we consider time fixed eﬀects to control for
common macro shocks, such that the errors are equicorrelated across space.7 In
next subsection we will test which form of spatial dependence prevails in the
data.
Our estimating panel equation is:8
tiι = α+Xiιθ + iι (2)
where the overall error consists of:
iι = μi + λι + φiι
Table 2 shows the results concerning the four diﬀerent eﬀective average cap-
ital tax rates presented in Section 2 and discussed in Appendix B plus the
statutory corporate tax rate. The taxes EATR and BACH can be interpreted
as based on micro data, while the last two (MM and SGDP) as based on macro
5High statutory tax countries in 2001 are: Belgium, Italy, Greece, Austria, Spain, France,
Netherlands and Portugal.
6Low statutory tax rate countries in the year 2001 are: Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Luxem-
bourg, UK, Denmark and Germany.
7Although this form of error component does not allow for distance decay eﬀects.
8 In this paper time is represented by ι (iota).
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Table 1: Mean and S.D. of eﬀective average tax rates.
Eﬀective capital tax Mean S.D.
EATR 29,2733 9,3840
Statutory Tax 39,6769 12,6907
BACH 14,6813 4,5863
MM 20,7664 6,3655
SGDP 2,9639 1,4626
data. The most striking feature of the series is the diﬀerent path they fol-
low across time (as presented in Ruiz (2006)[47] and explained in Sorensen
(2006)[51]), suggesting that the eﬀects of the explanatory variables may change
through the estimations.
Slemrod (2004) observes no association of the government expenditure -
GDP ratio with the corporate statutory rate and only a weak positive association
with the corporate tax revenue over GDP. In contrast, we find strong negative
relations between that ratio of government expenditures and the statutory tax
and micro eﬀective tax rates. That result may suggest that governments finance
their increasing expenditures from other sources of revenue. Observing macro
taxes, we also obtain negative coeﬃcients, although they appear not significant.
Examining next the variable of population over 65 years old, we can see an
element of redistribution in the society. Particularly, in the Statutory tax, EATR
and MM regressions we can clearly observe that the larger the phenomenon of
ageing population, the higher the capital tax.
The size variable in Statutory tax and EATR clearly supports the idea that a
large country may face a lower elasticity of capital to the tax rate, and therefore,
it may maintain a higher tax. For the rest of the estimations this coeﬃcient is
not significant.
Finally, the dummy variable for the EU membership shows negative coef-
ficients in the Statutory tax and EATR regressions, suggesting an increase in
competition when countries join the union. However, observing macro taxes we
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Table 2: Regressions without considering strategic interactions.
EATR St. Tax BACH MM SGDP
GEXP/GDP -1,6678 -1,7966 -1,2462 -0,1278 -0,1074
(0,00)a (0,00)a (0,00)a (0,24) (0,07)
Po65/Po 2,4292 5,2733 0,5307 1,5526 0,0318
(0,00)a (0,00)a (0,30) (0,00)a (0,74)
Size 0,7366 1,6507 -0,2864 0,2485 0,0691
(0,01)a (0,00)a (0,39) (0,11) (0,20)
EU -4,3954 -5,9896 1,0266 3,0178 0,7037
(0,00)a (0,00)a (0,32) (0,00)a (0,00)a
C 27,5275 -6,1657 35,2197 -2,8920 3,6290
(0,00)a (0,45) (0,00)a (0,33) (0,04)b
Observations 260 260 121 345 195
R2 0,8666 0,8868 0,8307 0,8919 0,8794
Log likelihood -688,7319 -745,7751 -248,0111 -743,7677 -144,1295
p-values are in parentheses
a Significant at 1% level.
b Significant at 5% level.
obtain a positive influence, reflecting a probable growth in the corporate income
tax base.
One open question to be analyzed in next sections is whether and how a
corporate tax regime in one country reacts to changes in neighboring countries.
4.2 Testing spatial dependencies
4.2.1 Spatial specification search
In our discussion of Appendix A we argue that spatial dependencies may be
due to spatially associated dependent variables or omitted variables, themselves
spatially associated, included in the error term. This section will try to unravel
that question; although, as it will be clear below, the diﬀerent eﬀective tax rates
and weighting matrices conduce to a wide range of results.
We explore the source of spatial dependency through the lagrange multiplier
test (LM), which has the absence of spatial correlation as the null hypothesis.
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One important point to highlight here is that the alternative hypothesis does
not diﬀerentiate between positive or negative spatial dependencies. Anselin, Le
Gallo and Jayet (2007)[4] provide the generalized formulas for the LM tests in
pooled models. The LM-Lag refers to the spatial lag model as the alternative
hypothesis and its extended form is:
LML =
[e0 (IT ⊗W ) t/ (e0e/NT )]2£
(W by)0M (W by) /σ2¤+ Ttr (W 2 +W 0W )
where e is a vector of regression residuals, W by = (IT ⊗W )Xbθ, and M =
INT − X (X 0X)−1X 0. Similarly, the LM-Error has the spatial error model as
the alternative hypothesis and its statistic becomes:
LME =
[e0 (IT ⊗W ) e/ (e0e/NT )]2
Ttr (W 2 +W 0W )
Both one-directional tests are distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom.
We present the results of the LM tests in Figure 3. There each lag and
error LM test is estimated considering a panel without fixed eﬀects (NE), with
country fixed eﬀects (CE), and with time and country fixed eﬀects (T&C E). As
expected, the outcomes of the tests point toward diﬀerent directions. Selecting
between a lag and an error model is not free from ambiguity, given that a result
indicating a lag model with one tax may suggest an error specification with a
diﬀerent tax. For example, looking at row W-2 with fixed eﬀects (T&C E) we
observe the spatial lag as the correct specification considering the EATR, al-
though we can reject the null hypothesis in favor of the spatial error specification
considering the MM.
One simple rule that can help us in our decision, based on common sense,
is to count the values rejecting the null hypothesis. From the 105 diﬀerent
alternatives we observe that 59 times we can reject the null hypothesis against
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the spatial lag model and only 49 times against the spatial error model. This
provides some evidence that the spatial lag model may imply the correct form of
spatial association. Moreover, it gives an indication that the theoretical results
suggesting strategic tax interactions among countries may be supported in the
data, although it does not tell us the direction of such interaction.
4.2.2 Fixed eﬀects tests
Our second search concerns the selection of a panel structure with country
eﬀects, time and country eﬀects or none of them. In Section 4.1 we have assumed
time fixed eﬀects to allow errors equicorrelated across space. That option can
be justified with a F-test or a likelihood ratio (LR) test. For instance, testing
for the existence of time eﬀects and allowing for individual eﬀects, i.e.
H0 : λ1 = ... = λT−1 = 0 allowing μ 6= 0; i = 1, ..., (N − 1)
we can perform a F-test, such that
F =
(RRSS − URSS) / (T − 1)
URSS/ (N − 1) (T − 1)−K
H0∼ F(T−1),(N−1)(T−1)−K
where the unrestricted residual sums of squares (URSS) is obtained from (2) and
the restricted residual sums of squares (RRSS) is calculated from an expression
similar to (2) without time eﬀects. Similarly, a test for the joint significance
for time and country eﬀects considers the RRSS without dummy variables and
N+T −2 degrees of freedom for the numerator. The first row in Figure 4 shows
the rejection of the null hypothesis of redundant time eﬀects in four of the five
cases, and redundant country and time eﬀects in the five taxes considered in
our panel model of Section 4.1.
With the inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent variable the tests can be
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EATR St. Tax BACH MM SGDP
LM-Lag 7,7784* 26,5626* 0,0160 0,0789 1,0734
LM-Error 4,0436** 17,1984* 0,2829 0,0496 1,9300
LM-Lag 51,6254* 59,8164* 0,4863 1,9381 0,0047
LM-Error 28,2248* 43,4783* 1,6131 0,8418 8,7302*
LM-Lag 20,7484* 14,9843* 2,0232 0,0012 6,2994**
LM-Error 4,7651** 1,8527 6,5556** 5,8004** 11,1782*
LM-Lag 9,1962* 27,2962* 0,0213 0,0149 0,0026
LM-Error 6,9931* 22,4969* 0,1148 0,0466 0,3145
LM-Lag 44,7983* 53,4406* 0,4101 1,0081 0,0028
LM-Error 25,5680* 42,8033* 1,5223 1,6790 7,5516*
LM-Lag 14,2523* 11,0884* 2,0927 0,1422 5,9042**
LM-Error 2,4419 0,9367 6,6845* 7,6344* 10,0764*
LM-Lag 14,2670* 39,6189* 6,9694* 0,8030 1,3760
LM-Error 9,5237* 33,8391* 2,7742 4,3420** 0,0893
LM-Lag 41,2764* 70,2198* 5,6041** 0,0005 4,9113**
LM-Error 13,6334* 37,5754* 0,1283 1,5190 0,2710
LM-Lag 0,0575 0,0407 4,3162** 8,1768* 6,1798**
LM-Error 2,0951 1,9192 6,3547** 15,3133* 6,4631**
LM-Lag 0,1664 2,5952 4,9181** 0,0423 2,4823
LM-Error 0,2074 0,8615 0,9811 3,6927 0,4385
LM-Lag 11,5971* 21,6053* 5,2529** 11,1049* 33,4544*
LM-Error 1,9803 7,6755* 1,0104 6,3621** 11,6181*
LM-Lag 3,9415** 6,8596* 1,1225 3,6921 9,5881*
LM-Error 0,1069 2,5310 0,5885 0,8401 7,1380*
LM-Lag 24,1680* 35,0226* 2,4203 22,1748* 0,6602
LM-Error 39,2263* 58,3606* 1,7745 15,9925* 1,5281
LM-Lag 21,1603* 59,1255* 4,0171** 15,7780* 6,2864**
LM-Error 13,2263* 45,0172* 0,2577 9,6266* 0,8907
LM-Lag 4,1740** 0,5037 7,2336* 6,4699** 0,8669
LM-Error 1,6891 0,0668 6,2358** 2,0920 0,2686
LM-Lag 0,0881 0,0665 0,0233 4,8057** 6,8890*
LM-Error 1,9919 0,2974 0,6529 5,7915** 0,9637
LM-Lag 5,6479** 17,6268* 2,3013 2,9302 1,0015
LM-Error 0,2608 4,9302** 0,1881 5,9713** 1,5950
LM-Lag 8,7498* 0,1547 2,7511 12,8992* 2,7452
LM-Error 9,8436* 2,9678 3,8295 14,7853* 3,7400
LM-Lag 1,2340 9,9467* 5,5487** 15,6228* 0,1131
LM-Error 8,0191* 38,3272* 3,1319 11,4129* 0,2182
LM-Lag 17,4800* 47,1801* 3,6298 0,5177 2,1620
LM-Error 8,4906* 23,0858* 0,0378 0,6336 2,1972
LM-Lag 8,7572* 1,5991 5,1659** 9,9840* 8,3127*
LM-Error 3,4807 1,5857 7,9802* 7,8787* 10,3561*
* Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
C.E.
T&C E.
N.E.
C.E.
T&C E.
N.E.
T&C E.
N.E.
C.E.
T&C E.
C.E.
T&C E.
N.E.
C.E.
W - 5
W - 6
W - 7
N.E.
C.E.
T&C E.
N.E.
C.E.
T&C E.
N.E.
W - 1
W - 2
W - 3
W - 4
Figure 3: LM tests.
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carried out in similar manner, as proposed by Elhorst (2003)[24]. Nevertheless,
for spatial panels estimated by maximum likelihood, the F-test is only asymp-
totically valid. For that reason, a LR test may provide a more reliable indicator
for model selection. Indeed, the LR test is unbiased and consistent. It requires
the computation of the log likelihood
l = −NT
2
µ
1 + log(2π + log
µ
e0e
NT
¶¶
As in the F-test, the LR test is conducted by looking at the diﬀerence be-
tween the log likelihood values of the restricted (lR) and unrestricted (lU ) ver-
sions of the equation. Further, −2 (lR − lU ) has a χ2 distribution with a number
of degrees of freedom equal to the quantity of parameters specified in H0.
The rest of rows in Figure 4 present the result for the diﬀerent weighting
schemes. They indicate a generalized rejection of the null hypotheses, suggesting
the inclusion of time and country dummy variables as correct characteristics.9
On the other hand, this is not somewhat unexpected. The eﬀective average tax
rates used in this study are likely to suﬀer from common shocks of the European
Union. For instance, a synchronization of the business cycle in Europe reported
by Artis and Zhang (1999)[5] is simultaneously aﬀecting the eﬀective tax BACH,
MM and SGDP (although it does not influence the Statutory tax and EATR).
It is also consistent with the idea that changes in foreign taxes not included in
the regression, are simultaneously aﬀecting the whole EU-15.
9Observe in Figure 3 that the inclusion of time and country fixed eﬀects also respect the
advantage towards a spatial lag model.
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EATR St. Tax BACH MM SGDP
T.E. 7,0157* 11,3425* 2,0412** 0,8620 1,9306**
C&T E. 33,8124* 33,9480* 14,4868* 46,2682* 36,2372*
T.E. 121,4008* 175,2418* 23,3270* 20,8763 25,7668*
C&T E. 451,5798* 452,4375* 168,2871* 644,6621* 372,2142*
T.E. 3,8321* 6,3787* 2,2551** 0,7093 2,8883*
C&T E. 34,9876* 30,1410* 14,7317* 45,9380* 37,8536*
T.E. 86,3201* 128,9189* 25,0748** 18,3652 32,6143*
C&T E. 459,5533* 436,7812* 170,5732* 644,5475* 377,3619*
T.E. 3,9695* 6,6106* 2,2975** 0,7890 2,7537*
C&T E. 33,3023* 29,0714* 14,7799* 46,0054* 38,1044*
T.E. 88,5024* 132,3047* 25,2433** 19,7437 32,3532*
C&T E. 452,1032* 431,2737* 170,6458* 644,8275* 378,8001*
T.E. 3,4633* 5,0897* 2,9328* 2,5102* 3,8751*
C&T E. 30,2502* 26,7380* 15,4585* 51,8630* 42,1226*
T.E. 82,6469* 115,1117* 26,1199* 33,4615** 34,5586*
C&T E. 437,1854* 418,0870* 170,3299* 656,2271* 384,1624*
T.E. 6,2972* 9,6908* 1,6142 0,5359 0,1598
C&T E. 34,4371* 34,9416* 13,5820* 46,8550* 37,8383*
T.E. 113,9933* 160,9797* 19,5449** 13,9622 3,9671
C&T E. 455,188* 457,2876* 165,0197* 648,0623* 377,0939*
T.E. 5,483* 4,6754* 4,0735* 0,4454 1,3704
C&T E. 28,5719* 24,8375* 17,8408* 42,2174* 35,9507*
T.E. 104,6447* 112,2770* 32,2199* 12,6879 20,3063
C&T E. 428,0919* 409,3752* 178,4230* 626,8815*  372,5250*
T.E. 7,2781* 8,7109* 2,2000** 1,6406 2,1533**
C&T E. 35,5651* 33,6631* 15,0345* 48,4836* 35,0705*
T.E. 124,5762* 154,5864* 24,3393** 32,6835 27,7587**
C&T E. 460,5863* 452,5141* 171,6561* 654,8572* 369,4713*
T.E. 6,8184* 6,6653* 2,7563* 1,8026 4,0094*
C&T E. 36,9585* 32,3042* 15,0313* 47,2235* 42,1788*
T.E. 117,9873* 133,8569* 27,4561* 34,8834** 39,4286*
C&T E. 464,5468* 445,7965* 170,9009* 647,8371* 387,8648*
* Significant at 1% level
** Significant at 5% level
W-7
W-3
W-4
W-5
W-6
Redundant fixed effects tests
No spatial effects
W-1
W-2
F-test
LR-test
F-test
LR-test
F-test
LR-test
F-test
LR-test
F-test
LR-test
F-test
LR-test
F-test
LR-test
F-test
LR-test
Figure 4: F and LR tests.
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4.3 Pooled cross-section estimation considering interna-
tional pressures
4.3.1 Maximum likelihood methods
In previous subsections we have defined the spatially lagged panel with time
and country fixed eﬀects as the appropriate structure for the present study.
Accordingly, our estimating equation is:
tiι = α+ β
X
j 6=i
'ijtj,ι +Xiιθ + iι
and the overall error structure consists of:
iι = μi + λι + φiι
The reduced form of this equation is estimated using maximum likelihood
methods, in the Matlab package developed by Elhorst.
The results are presented in Appendix C. The first column in Figure 5 and 6
repeats the results provided in Table 2. Those numbers are included to allow an
easy comparison and to show consistency among the diverse estimations. The
discussion of our explanatory variables is already provided in Section 4.1, and,
as we can see, their eﬀects do not vary across the diverse spatial associations.
On the other hand, the parameter β is the most important estimated coeﬃcient
in the present study and represents the level of interdependence or competitive
pressures countries face when setting the tax.
The tables show a rather conflicting evidence of tax interdependency. Ob-
serving the results for the Statutory tax and the EATR data with minimum
distance weighting matrices, we do find evidence of strategic interactions. As
explained in Ruiz and Gérard (2007)[48] the EATR series are constructed tak-
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ing a limited number of provisions of the tax codes. Therefore, the results may
suggest that countries are mimicking taxes and tax codes main reforms of their
close neighbors. Those results were also found by Devereux, Lockwood and Re-
doano (2002) and by Redoano (2003). Considering next economic and cluster
weights, we obtain negative coeﬃcients. It suggests that countries close in GDP
or another a priori form of tax clustering have reacted dissimilarly to changes
in taxes of their neighbors. Particularly with economic weights, this result is in
some degree surprising, because a second finding of Devereux, Lockwood and
Redoano (2002) and Redoano (2003) is that the EATR and the Statutory tax
in a country is positively associated to taxes of its economic neighbors.
In BACH data we observe a diﬀerent pattern. For distance weights, we do
not find evidence of proper strategic interactions. If there is such interaction,
the results suggest that this is negative, showing a chess board pattern in the
data. In particular, W-3 shows a significant negative value, which is supported
by the more conservative LM-Lag test of Figure 3. For economic and cluster
weights the outcomes are similar, indicating an absence or negative interaction.
In W-5 and W-7 we find negative βs, which correspond with the LM-Lag test
of Figure 3.
There also appears some evidence of negative strategic interactions consid-
ering distance weights W-3 for MM series. If we examine at the same time our
second macro tax SGDP, we see negative significant βs with distance weights
too. This clearly indicates that macro taxes are not spatially interdependent
between geographical neighbors in the expected way. This again contradicts
one previous finding obtained by Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) who show a
positive association using SGDP series and inverse distance weights. Observing
macro taxes with economic weights, the results indicate some positive associa-
tions, particularly with MM taxes, although the more conservative LM-Lag test
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is not significant for W-4 and only slightly significant for W-5. Additionally,
with SGDP taxes we cannot argue in favor of positive interactions because of
the way the series are constructed (the positive interactions may only reflect an
association of GDP and not of eﬀective taxes). Finally, examining clustering
weights and macro taxes we can only conclude in a direction of negative spatial
associations.
Summing up, our findings indicate a probable mimicking strategy of statu-
tory taxes and main tax code reforms between close geographical neighbors.
However, considering other eﬀective tax burdens, countries in the European
Union do not seem to accommodate their taxes in a sort of strategic interac-
tion or tax competition. In addition, all eﬀective taxes probably suﬀer from
common external shocks as indicated by the presence of time fixed eﬀects. In
other words, the results can be interpreted as representing an EU-15 acting like
a block, reacting to common shocks, and interacting in a limited form between
close geographical neighbors.
4.3.2 Instrumental variables procedure
For the sake completeness and illustration, this subsection will try to reproduce
the results obtained above in the EATR and Statutory tax using instrumental
variables or a two stage least squares procedure. Time and country fixed eﬀects
are again considered in the estimation. It is worth mentioning that previous
studies analyzing tax interaction among countries have followed this approach.
The instrumental variable estimation involves a preliminary least squares
regression of Wτ t on a set of instruments. Kelejian and Robinson (1993)[33]
suggest WXt as a set of instruments in addition to the exogenous variables Xt
(which are always included as instruments). This choice of instruments follows
from (4), where (I−βW )−1Xθ can be expanded in Xθ+βWXθ+β2W 2Xθ+ ...
.
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Figure 7 in Appendix C presents the results of this method. Although we
will not examine each estimation in detail, we can observe a similar conflicting
evidence of strategic interactions. In general, the estimated coeﬃcients conserve
the signs of the panel model without spatial eﬀects. When the estimated spa-
tially autoregressive parameter turns out to be significant, it normally preserves
the signs found by maximum likelihood. Particularly, we find again positive βs
using minimum distance weights in the EATR and Statutory tax. One main
problem for preserving signs is the explosive pattern the spatial parameter shows
in a number of estimations; and that occurs in several occasions. There appear
βs > |1| in EATR W-3 and Statutory tax W-3, W-4, W-5 and W-7. We have
already mentioned that characteristic as the main drawback of this approach.
The spatially autoregressive parameter is unrestricted and, as seen in the results,
it can produce values larger than one which indicate an unacceptable explosive
spatial association.
5 Conclusions
The estimations considering a classical search for strategic interactions, conclude
in favor of a limited mimicking between close neighboring countries using Statu-
tory and EATRs, but an absence of interdependency considering other measures
of capital taxation. As explained in Ruiz and Gérard (2007)[48], EATRs are
constructed taking into account a limited number of provisions of the tax codes.
That may imply countries are mimicking tax codes main reforms of their close
neighbors, but at the time of considering tax burdens eﬀectively paid and sup-
ported by enterprises, national states still diﬀer by large, not interacting between
themselves. Additionally, all eﬀective taxes in the EU-15 are likely suﬀering
from common external shocks, suggesting that the countries constitute a block
reacting to general external factors.
23
EATR St. Tax BACH MM SGDP
Distance weight Yes (+) Yes(+) No No Yes (-)
Economic weight Yes (-) Yes(-) Yes (-) Yes (+) —
Cluster Yes (-) No No Yes (-) No
Statutory cluster Yes(-) No Yes (-) Yes (-) Yes (-)
Table 3: Summary of strategic interactions.
In Table 3 we summarize the diﬀerent cases examined in the first part of
this paper, showing when β is significant and the sign of its coeﬃcient in that
case. The table can directly be compared with Figure 1 of the introduction,
which summarized previous results of the literature. Nevertheless, those pre-
vious studies have used instrumental variables procedures, which can derive in
explosive spatial associations and certain instability in the coeﬃcients when the
correct instruments are not available.
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6 Appendix A. Estimation problems
Some main issues arise in the estimation of equation (1), notably the endogeneity
of tj ’s and possible spatial error dependence (see Anselin, 1988[3]).
The first issue, the endogeneity problem, especially results from the strategic
spatial interaction among governments, which derives in the values of t being
jointly determined. Writing (1) in matrix form
τ = βWτ +Xθ +  (3)
where τ is an n by 1 vector of dependent variables,  is an n by 1 vector of error
terms, X is an n by K matrix of exogenous variables including the constant
term, β and θ are as before and W is a n by n spatial weights matrix, typically
standardized such that each row sums to one. The spatial weight matrix is
necessary due to the lack of information to estimate a complete set of spatial
interaction coeﬃcients (N(N − 1)) (where N here is the number of countries)
and to circumvent the identification problem. By imposing a particular form
for the spatial process, the model may be estimated and tested empirically.
Solving for τ , in the reduced form we obtain the following Nash equilibrium
generated by interaction among governments
τ = AXθ +A where A = (I − βW )−1 (4)
Because of the random component of τ is equal to the inner product ofA with
the error vector , each tax depends on all ’s. The resulting correlation implies
that the OLS estimator will be biased as well as inconsistent for the parameters
of the model. To see this, observe that the OLS estimate of β in a pure first
order spatial autoregressive model is bβ = (t0LtL)−1t0Lτ (where tL = Wt). If
we substitute τ in the former expression we find that bβ = β + (t0LtL)−1t0L
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where the second term on the right-hand side does not have expectation zero,
because τ and  are not independent. Thus an OLS estimator of this model is
biased. Moreover, if we divide the last part of the random term by N and take
probability limits p limN−1(t0L) = p limN
−10W (I − βW )−1 we find it will
not equal zero with exception to the case when β = 0, implying that an OLS
estimator is inconsistent.10
Two methods are usually used to deal with this problem. The first one is
to estimate the reduced form equation (4) using maximum likelihood methods.
The second way is an instrumental variable or two stage least squares approach.
Anselin (1988) also proposes Bayesian techniques instrumented among others
by LeSage (1997)[37].
The second issue, spatial error dependence (i.e. when the diﬀerent juris-
dictions are subject to correlated random shocks), produces that the standard
assumption of a spherical error covariance matrix11 fails to hold. Such spatial
dependence can arise when the error term includes omitted variables, which are
themselves spatially dependent. The most commonly used assumption is that
the error vector satisfies the relationship:
 = λW+ φ (5)
where λ is an unknown parameter, W is a weighting matrix (usually assumed
to be the same as in 3) and φ is the i.i.d. error term with constant variance σ2.
Therefore, the error variance has the form σ2(I − λW )−1
£
(I − λW )−1
¤0
.12
The estimation in the presence of spatially dependent error terms requires a
special approach given that inference based on the usual variance associated with
10The p limN−1
¡
t0LtL
¢
is a finite and nonsingular matrix with a proper structure to the
spatial weight matrix and constraining |β| < 1.
11The sphericity assumption states that all variances are constant, i.e. the covariance matrix
is a scalar multiple of the identity matrix (σ2I).
12Observe that the reduced form of (5) is  = (I − λW )−1 φ.
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OLS estimates may be misleading. One approach is to use ML to estimate (3)
considering (5) (this line was followed by Case et al.,1993[17]). Another remedy
is to rely on IV estimation. Kelejian and Prucha (1998)[32] have demonstrated
that even in the presence of spatial error dependence, IV method yields a con-
sistent estimation of β, although it does not utilize information relating to the
possible spatial correlation of the error term.13 Finally, the third approach is
to estimate the spatial lag model (3) by ML assuming error independence and
using a hypothesis test to verify this absence (as in Brueckner and Saavedra,
2001).
7 Appendix B
7.1 Martinez-Mongay series
Martinez-Mongay calculated an eﬀective capital income tax considering taxes
on personal income from capital, taxes on corporate income and property taxes.
The tax revenue from corporations is estimated taking the total direct taxes on
income and wealth from AMECO (DTRV). Using the OECD Revenue Statistics
databank, he calculates the proportion of "Corporate taxes on income, profits
and capital gains" (1200) over the amount of direct taxation (i.e. "Taxes on
income, profits and capital gains of individuals" (1100) + "Corporate taxes on
income, profits and capital gains" (1200) + "Revenues from any kind of property
taxes" (4000)). Therefore the corporate tax revenue (CORV) is equal to:
CORV = DTRV × 1200
1100 + 1200 + 4000
In the same way the property tax revenue (PWRV) is equal to:
13Kelejian and Prucha (1998) extend the spatial 2SLS model to include spatial error com-
ponents.
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PWRV = DTRV × 4000
1100 + 1200 + 4000
The tax revenue from taxes on personal income from capital is computing
firstly estimating an eﬀective tax rate on personal income (PITR), where as
before the personal income tax revenue is:
PIRV = DTRV × 1100
1100 + 1200 + 4000
And the personal income tax base (PITB) is equal to:
PITB = LETB −NWRV| {z }
Household income from labour
+
+NOS − (LETB − COEL)| {z }
imputed wage of self-employed
− CORV − PWRV
| {z }
household income from capital
Where
LETB: Labor eﬀective tax base (including self employment) =
Total compensation of employees × occupied population
employees
NWLC: Non-wage labor costs = Social security contributionsLETB
NOS: Net operating surplus of the economy
COEL: Total compensation of employees
Therefore
PITR =
PIRV
PITB
And the capital eﬀective tax rate (KETG) is:
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KETG =
CORV + PWRV + PITR× household income from capital
GOSA
Where the tax base (GOSA) is the gross operating surplus adjusted for the
imputed wage income of the self-employed
GOSA = GOS − (LETB − COEL)
7.2 BACH series
The BACH series were generated, following Nicodème, as the ratio of taxes paid
on Gross Operating Profit,
τ =
T
GOP
using BACH database for the manufacturing enterprises.
7.3 Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm series
Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm calculate the EATR of the manufacturing sec-
tor as the diﬀerence between pre and post net present values of an investment
in plant and machinery, scaled by the pre-tax total income stream, net of de-
preciation. This is analogous to other measures of average tax rates, in which
observed tax payments are divided by a measure of pre-tax profit.
EATR =
NPV ∗ −NPV
p∗
1+r
where the pre-tax NPV is
NPV ∗ =
p∗ − r
1 + r
p∗ is a pre-tax rate of return to be fixed and r is the real interest rate.
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The post-tax NPV is the diﬀerence between the present value of the income
and the present value of the cost of the asset.
NPV = V − C = (p
∗ + δ)(1− τ) + (1− δ)(1−A)
1 + r
where δ is the economic rate of depreciation of the asset, τ is the corporate tax
rate and A is the present value of allowances per unit of investment.
Devereux and Griﬃth show that the EATR can be rewritten as a weighted
average of the EMTR and the statutory rate τ .
EATR =
ep
p∗
EMTR+
µ
1− ep
p∗
¶
τ
7.4 Corporate Tax Revenue / GDP series
The SGDP series were constructed as the ratio of "Corporate taxes on income,
profits and capital gains" (1200), extracted from the "Revenue Statistics 1965-
1999" cd-rom (OECD), on GDP
τ =
1200
GDP
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8 Appendix C
Figure 5: Maximum likelihood estimators.
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Figure 6: Maximum likelihood estimators.
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Figure 7: IV estimators.
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